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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e ls evier . co m/lo c ate / jc omAs long as there have been co-operative enterprises, there have
been voices arguing that co-operatives are weak due to a lack of
face-full owners. The critics over-rule the co-operative and
underline the joint-stock company as a better form of governance.
Their argument is that the latter allows control for a single
individual entrepreneur, who provides the ﬁrm with a face and
identity.
Others see co-operatives a weaker form of governance as
compared to the public corporation. For them the problem is the
lack of market control. In fact, it is argued that co-operatives have
no real ownership, since there is not a market for the shares on an
everyday basis. They associate ownership not with identity and
control, but with equity and transferable rights.
In this paper, I comment on these critiques from the perspective
of a practitioner with decades of experience in the governance of
different types of co-operatives. I argue the co-operative is a
collective with potential for effective governance. My argument
rests to great extent on the nature of co-operative ownership,
which provides an incentive for governance that differs from that
assumed by the critics.
1. Co-operative ownership
A co-operative may have hundreds or thousands or hundreds-
of-thousands members. In this respect it is similar to the public
corporation with widely spread shareholding. There is a major
difference, however.
In a public corporation with dispersed ownership the owners
are investors with a mere capitalistic value expectation. There may* Corresponding author.
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corporation. Those in possession of ownership rights may also be
speculators with no interest in what the company does or which
direction the value of the company goes.
Co-operatives operate in a very different reality. Member-
owners have several reasons to hope for and look after the success
of their co-operative in the long run. As patrons, they look for good
price and service, etc. Because of the non-transferability of the co-
operative stock, the value of membership is primarily based on the
value derived from transactions with the co-operative.
2. Incentives for governance
Predominant ideas of ﬁrm ownership or proprietorship do not
apply in a co-operative. Despite of this, co-operatives are typically
approached as if they were investor-owned. They are paralleled with
large public corporations, where the owners are collectively too
numerous and individually too powerless to be able to control the
corporation successfully. As there is no marketplace for co-operative
‘shares’, all comes down to the Board or the Annual meeting of the
co-operative. Thereby, the traditional view predicts inefﬁciency.
Usually the ‘price’ of a stake is low and this is believed to lead into a
lack of member interest in co-operative affairs. Also the Board is
believed to consist of members, who all have a low interest from an
individual point of view. When the owners’ representatives lack
interest to control, the role of the CEO and the management is
believed to ﬁll the power vacuum with their own interests. Thereby,
from the traditional point of view, a co-operative company is
doomed to fail in executing its purpose.
The above story has its ﬂaws, however. First, in many large co-
operatives there is member interest, because of the substantial role
the co-operative and the transactions with the co-operative play in
the economies of the members. Second, many co-operatives, even
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ownership the members experience for their co-operative.
Examples include the producer co-operative Danish Crown
(Denmark, approx. 20 000 members) and the forest co-operative
Metsa¨liitto (Finland, 127 000 members). In both co-operatives
there are on a national level a large members’ administration
organized. Democracy provides all members with a voice and
active members in the governing bodies take care of the tasks
important for successful co-operation. The arrangement means
annually hundreds of local and regional meetings for the elected
non-executive members and the management. The democracy of
the co-operative is satisﬁed with a large transparency and
decisions are made on a broad base. The representative assembly
consists of regionally elected members. This body elects a
supervisory board which elects the Board of the co-operative.
The role of the owners is guaranteed with this kind of members’
movement.
When ownership is associational, there is a good change that
psychological ownership motivations are at play. As members feel
the co-operative is theirs, they are motivated to use their voice.
Further, administrators with a sense of ownership turn into
contributing stewards. Noteworthy, it is the active members thatalso provide the co-operative with a face. In sum, instead dynamics
related to equity ownership, it is psychological ownership that
secures the success and future of the co-operative form of
enterprise.
3. Conclusion
Members of co-operatives are not ﬁrm owners in the traditional
orthodox way as there is no marketplace for the members’ stakes.
However, the member-owners have both their daily activities and
their ‘‘hearts’’ with the co-operative. Social and psychological
attachment of the members to their co-operative is promoted by
the co-operative basic principles–all that the co-operative does is
directed toward promoting the members, directly or indirectly.
Most essentially, the key to successful corporate governance can be
found in human and social factors rather than structural factors. It
is the effective social system fueled with feelings of ownership that
serves to generate success by engaging and motivating members,
representatives, and board members in co-operation. This is how I
see it and I am positive that may of my peers agree. I hope future
research will address this issue in a rigorous and reliable academic
manner.
